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Abstract
This research aims to test the impact of the mandatory adoption of XBRL towards the systemic
risk of American financial institutions listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) by utilizing
45 NYSE listed financial institutions for the time period of 2007-2012. The measure of systemic
risk is based on SRisk by Acharya et al. (2012) which is available in the NYU Stern V-Lab.
XBRL is a dummy variable, in which 0 represents a pre XBRL adoption period (2007-2008)
while 1 represents an XBRL reporting environment (2011-2012). It is further interacted with
Corporate Governance, which is measured using an index developed by Brown & Caylor (2006).
The result proves that XBRL do not significantly impact systemic risk of financial institutions
listed in NYSE. The findings have been determined after having controlled firm size, capital
ratio, leverage ratio and performance.3
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This research focuses on the impact of XBRL towards systemic risk of financial institutions listed in NYSE. Apart
from this, it will also test the impact of the adoption towards size, capital ratio, leverage and performance of the
financial institutions. The sample includes all financial institutions listed in NYSE between the years of 2007-2012.
The impact is determined by comparing the systemic risk of individual financial institutions pre and post the
mandate of XBRL adoption in U.S. in 2009, in which the year 2009 and 2010 will be considered as transition
periods due to the fact that XBRL is implemented through phased-in approach. Based on the data of 45 financial
institutions, the findings will provide meaningful analysis and worthy discussions over the subject of XBRL. This
research is expected to contribute to 1. Companies (Financial Institutions) Financial institutions that are committed
towards improving their corporate governance, can utilize this research to have an idea regarding how XBRL can
serve as the tool to improve their corporate governance while also mitigating risky behaviors (which in turn reduces
systemic risk) in order to further maximize their shareholder values. 2. Investors This research has the potential to
provide investors with new insights which can assist in their decision making particularly regarding financial
institutions. They will be acquired with the knowledge that financial firms with XBRL in place will provide them
with timely and accurate information, improving their decision making. XBRL enhances transparency of financial
firms which means that investors will face less difficulty in analyzing the financial information and will be able to
properly asses the risk associated in their investments. 3. Government (Regulatory Agencies) In understanding the
impact of XBRL towards systemic risk in U.S. financial institutions, regulatory agencies all around the world that
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this globalized economy, the role of financial institutions has become increasingly critical. Its
role as the intermediary to channel the capital across the economy has shown how essential this
industry is for the economic development of a country as a whole. Schnyder (2012) stated that as
long as the financial institutions are tightly regulated and their resources are distributed
effectively, they can act as the catalyst for rapid economic development.
Unfortunately, in 2008, the collapse of some U.S. financial institutions has resulted in a
global financial catastrophe which affected the economies of countries all over the world (Erkens
et al. 2012). The causes of the crisis have been mainly linked to their excessive risk taking
activities. Iqbal et al. (2015) and Mehran et al. (2011) noted that prior to the crisis, financial
institutions have been engaging in high risk high return practices in order to maximize their
shareholder value, which in turn increased their vulnerability towards systemic risk. In general,
systemic risk is defined as the degree to which the activities or actions of an individual institution
can affect the financial system as a whole. The higher the systemic risk, the greater the likelihood
of the whole financial system to cripple; when a single institution diverges from the collective
interest of the system. (Jickling & Murphy, 2010).
Therefore, it amplifies the interest as to how the corporate governance of such highly
regulated industry managed to fail to limit the apparent risky behaviors of financial institutions.
The flaws in corporate governance originated from the fact that their business activities are much
more complex and opaque than non-financial firms (Erkens et al. 2012). Levine (2011) stated
that much financial related information is kept secret from the public. Hence, the role of equity
holders as external governance is highly questionable. Iqbal et al. (2015) further stated that
investors may have neglected or became less sensitive towards banking activities due to its
growing complexity and opaqueness. Thus, this leads to the significance in the role of
information and disclosures within the proper functioning of financial system. A study conducted
by Mehran & Mollineaux (2012) outlines the role of information and disclosures in mitigating
both fundamental market failures and their proximate manifestations as governance failures. The
study also shows a wide literature regarding the positive relationship between increased
disclosures and the proper functioning of the market system as a whole.

are facing similar problems can utilize the same tool in order to limit the risk taking behavior of financial institutions
and thereby reducing the systemic risk of the whole financial industry. Countries such as Indonesia (currently still in
the process of developing XBRL Taxonomies since 2002), that has not mandated XBRL, can take into account the
findings of this research to further evaluate the benefits or weaknesses in the XBRL implementation specifically
towards financial institutions. 4. Academicians and Students This research provides students and academicians
better understanding about the relationship of XBRL with systemic risk. Due to the fact that there have been limited
studies connecting the two variables, this study serves as a starting point for researchers to further analyze how
XBRL can potentially act as an appropriate tool to safeguard the well-being of the economy. Furthermore, as this
research also assesses its impact on specifically the financial industry, researchers can further evaluate its impact on
other industries.
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One of the ways to improve the current reporting procedure is through the implementation of
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL). XBRL serves as the potential common
delivery system to achieve the objective stated above. In today’s dynamic, technology-driven
environment, the use of XBRL will allow the utilization of standardized tagging system for both
quantitative and qualitative information (Arnold et al. 2012). It can improve the reliability and
efficiency of both financial and non-financial reporting, while making it easier for the
shareholders to extract all information that they need (Blankerspoor et al., 2012). Yoon et al.
(2011) also argued that the use of XBRL can reduce the cost of capital and information
asymmetry in the capital market. However, Liu et al. (2014) pointed out that the application of
XBRL can be hindered due to the nature of IT productivity, in which any new technology will
require considerable amount of time to be implemented effectively in the capital market.
Despite the advancement of the use of XBRL and the importance of financial institutions,
there has been a lack of detailed studies as to the impact of XBRL implementation to the
industry. Furthermore, there have been limited studies as well as to how the XBRL can affect the
systemic risk of the financial institutions. Based on those facts, this study aims to test the impact
of the mandatory adoption of XBRL in American financial institutions listed in New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) towards systemic risk. NYSE is chosen as it has mandated the financial
statement filings through XBRL since 2009, after the fall of its financial markets which initiated
the global financial catastrophe. This study investigates whether the mandatory XBRL filings in
the NYSE could reduce the systemic risk of American financial institutions by improving their
corporate governance practices, considering how XBRL can enhance the information
transparency in the market. It will also examine the change in impact of size, capital ratio,
leverage and financial performance of firms on systemic risk pre and post XBRL adoption.

II. Literature Review
2.1 Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk
The main role of financial institutions is to act as intermediaries to allocate capital across the
economy. They receive capitals in the form of deposits (or funds) from individuals or businesses
with excess of resources and channel them into those with insufficient resources in the form of
loans (Acharya & Richardson, 2009). Financial institutions, especially LCFIs (Large Complex
Financial Institutions) play a critical function in the development of the economy as a whole.
Without them, the flow of capital will be stagnant as capital possessed by those in excess will not
be properly channeled to those in need. Moreover, financial institutions are interconnected with
one another. Generally, the owners of financial institutions are mostly institutional shareholders.
These shareholders are also financial institutions that bought majority of the firm’s shares. For
example, 87.7% of the shares of an American insurance company, AIG (American International
Group, Inc.), are owned by institutional or mutual funds holder (Yahoo Finance, 2016). Capital
Group, another American financial services company, owns majority of these shares. Such
interconnectedness and significance in their role in the economy render them to high systemic
risk. Systemic risk is defined as the risk of a severe financial instability or collapse of the entire
economy, which has been caused by a triggering event made at a company level (Jickling &
Murphy, 2010). This means that the failure of a LCFI will likely create a ‘domino effect’ for the
rest of the firms operating in the same system. The 2008 financial crisis serves as an evidence of
the systemic vulnerability of financial institutions. Such event had generated severe financial
catastrophe in which financial institutions around the world were suffering losses worth billions
25

AABFJ | Volume 11, no. 4, 2017

of dollars and stock markets plunged to the very bottom. The global financial meltdown has been
caused by the burst in the financial ‘bubble’ created by some financial institutions in U.S, most
prominently being Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers and AIG (American International Group, Inc).
These firms have been involved in excessive risk taking activities in the form of subprime
mortgages and credit default swaps which have resulted in credit boom and the creation of a
housing bubble (Bullard et al., 2009). Mortgages are granted to individuals with little ability to
fulfill their payment and on top of that, these mortgages received approval and guaranteed by
credit rating companies. As a result, these firms filed bankruptcy during the crisis. As recently
noted by Iqbal et al. (2015), there is a high correlation between the stand alone risk of individual
financial institutions and the overall level of systemic risk. It is caused by the fact that financial
institutions which practice excessively risky behaviors are likely to generate negative
externalities towards the whole financial system by increasing systemic risk. The causes of the
financial crisis and how it is linked to corporate governance mechanism of financial institutions
will be further elaborated in the next section.
2.2 Why Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions is triggered by Good Corporate Governance
Corporate governance refers to a set of mechanism which controls and directs how the
companies are being managed both internally and externally (Iqbal et al., 2015; Arnold et al.,
2012). The proper use of corporate governance can bring numerous benefits for firms, in
particular to mitigate the agency problem. Based on the value maximization principle, firms must
operate in accordance to the interests of their owners instead of the management. Sound
corporate governance will act as the control for firms to maximize the shareholders’ value with
fair and just decision making (Mehran & Mollineaux, 2012). Schnyder (2012) also reaffirmed
this statement, stating that sound corporate governance practices will indeed prevent
shareholders from being exploited by internal management through an effective control
mechanism. Thus, the interests of shareholders and management will be aligned, resolving
agency problem.
Nonetheless, studies have shown that over the years, financial institutions have been
increasingly exposed towards excessively risky behaviors. It is believed that it is actually caused
by good corporate governance of financial institutions, in which based on the value
maximization principle, firms must operate in the interests of their shareholders. They tend to
maximize shareholders’ value without considering the riskiness of their investment decisions
(Arnold et al., 2012). Before the crisis, corporate governance mechanisms are designed in such a
way that they encourage risk taking activities. Such mechanisms are mainly associated with the
structure of boards in a firm. Boards can be considered as the most essential mechanism of
corporate governance (Mehran & Mollineaux, 2011). The risky behaviors of financial
institutions are based on their decisions. Prior crisis, Belttrati & Stulz (2012) documented that
banks with more shareholder-friendly boards are associated with riskier investments (as cited in
Iqbal et al. 2015). DeYoung et al. (2010) also found that banks have been altering CEO
compensation to encourage risky behaviors in order to generate higher profit. DeYoung et al.
(2010) found that CEOs’ wealth has increased significantly before crisis. Moreover, as a sign of
‘good corporate governance’, board of directors must contain a strong independent representative
who can act as an additional monitor over the activities of other directors and also the
management. However, according to Mehran et al. (2011), there is a ‘dark side to expertise’ in
boards of directors, in which these independent directors are only hired to further justify their
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risk taking activities. Shareholders will be misdirected into thinking that their boards are well
monitored by the independent directors.
Therefore, based on the above examples, it raises questions as to what has caused the
inability of the corporate governance mechanisms of financial institutions to detect and limit
such risky behaviors. Many studies have connected such flaws with the opacity, complexity and
obscurity in the activities of financial institutions (Claessens, 2006). According to Morgan
(2002), the opacity of financial information originated from their nature of business activities.
Their portfolio of loans is often unavailable to external stakeholders and derivative instruments
are complex with risks that are too difficult to measure. Prior the crisis, financial institutions tend
to be engaged in activities involving SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and complex
securitizations. Levine (2004) further states that “banks can alter the risk composition of their
assets more quickly than most nonfinancial industries, and banks can readily hide problems by
extending loans to clients that cannot service previous debt obligations.” The opacity and
complexity of financial institutions have clearly dismissed the ability of financial statement users
to understand and assess risks over their activities.
2.3 Role of Information and Disclosures in Mitigating Excessive Risk Taking Behaviors of
Financial Institutions
Many studies have suggested a correlation between the excessive risk taking behaviors of
financial institutions with the opacity and complexity of their activities (Dhouibi et al. 2016;
Bushman, 2016; Mehran & Mollineaux, 2012; Nier & Baumann, 2006). The studies listed have
highlighted the importance in the role of transparency and understandability towards enhancing
market discipline of financial institutions, which will in turn limit their risky behaviors.
According to Nier & Baumann (2006), market discipline can serve as a mechanism which will
curb their intention to undergo excessively risky investment decisions, by making such activities
more costly. This is based on the belief that market participants, which include but not limited
to shareholders and investors, will likely react and exert pressure to financial institutions when
they are undergoing extremely risky behaviors. Financial institutions, on the other hand, will
have the incentive to act prudently and efficiently, having known that their activities are being
observed by the market participants (Bushman, 2016). Hence, it is necessary for financial
institutions to increase their quality of information available to their external stakeholders.
According to IASB (2013) this can be achieved by improving quality of common
disclosures via a common delivery system. Disclosures made by firms are ways in which they
communicate to their external stakeholders. Enhanced quality of disclosures will enable users of
financial statements to acquire sufficient information which can assist them in their gathering,
analysis and decision making process.
2.4 XBRL as the Most Suitable Common Delivery System to Reduce Systemic Risk
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) refers to an international standard for digital
business reporting, which utilizes XML (Extensible Markup Language) reporting language to
enable automated communication of business and financial data (Kernan, 2008). It was first
introduced by Charles Hoffman back in 1998 and since then, it has been experiencing rapid
growth and is widely used in numerous capital markets, supporting both the financial and nonfinancial reporting by taking advantage of the advancement and immediacy of World Wide Web
(Arnold et al. 2012). The significance in its growth can be seen from the fact that until today,
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there are about 50 countries that have adopted XBRL, some of which have even mandated its
use.
Unlike the static data contained in PDF and HTML based reports, the data which uses
XBRL format has its own meaning, descriptions and attributes. An XBRL instance document
can be viewed as a system of barcodes in which each barcode contains its own information. Each
‘code’ or tagged data has its own element organized within the categorization scheme, known as
taxonomy. The function of XBRL Taxonomy in literal terms is similar to a ‘dictionary’. It
contains diverse financial concepts, in which these concepts serve as descriptions or explanations
of the tagged item from the XBRL Instance Document, depending on which element it is
associated with.
XBRL has the potential to act as the most suitable delivery system which can mitigate the
corporate governance problems associated with excessive risk taking behaviors of financial
institutions. Blankerspoor et al. (2012) argued that the use of XBRL can enhance the
transparency of the reporting firms, in which the reporting firms will be obliged to follow the
pre-determined template and fill the required information. Such template will diminish the
possibility of financial institutions failing to disclose relevant information to their external
stakeholders. Furthermore, the XBRL tagging system extracts information directly from the
company’s database, ensuring that all relevant transactions are actually disclosed. Yoon et al.
(2011) also pointed out that the use of XBRL will reduce the information asymmetry between
the investors and the reporting firms through increased transparency. This helps reduce the
investors’ uncertainty and exposure to risk, as the use of XBRL will result in more reliable and
easily accessible information which is imperative in the marketplace. Additionally, XBRL
enhances understandability through the provision of a well-structured format and its tagging
system. In particular, the tagging feature enables users to understand the relationship between
each data and also the origin of its amount. As a result, the complex derivatives and SPVs
employed by financial institutions will be made more understandable through the tagging
system, giving investors the opportunity to properly asses their riskiness. Investors’ decisions
will be based on a more meaningful and richer data, which enables them to act as external
monitors in measuring the risky behaviors of financial institutions and react when management is
not operating based on their interests. Thus, they can exert pressure by forcing financial
institutions to maintain high amount of capital and limit the amount of debt taken. When
financial institutions are forced to maintain high amount of capital and low amount of liabilities,
they have little ability to take on risky investments, which will in turn reduce the firms’
exposures towards systemic risk. Moreover, based on the findings of Premuroso & Bhattacharya
(2008), there is a positive association between XBRL adoption and corporate governance,
showing that XBRL serves as a tool which may help improve the corporate governance of
financial institutions.

III. Hypothesis Development
The critical role of financial institutions in the economy and their high degree of
interconnectedness, make them vulnerable towards systemic risk. According to Iqbal et al.
(2015), financial institutions tend to engage in excessively risky behaviors in order to increase
their profit. Such risky behaviors have increased their vulnerability towards systemic risk. As
seen from the 2008 financial crisis, such behaviors were undetected and failed to be mitigated by
the corporate governance mechanisms of financial institutions. Corporate governance is claimed
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to be the mechanism which should have detected such risky behaviors of financial institutions.
According to Arnold et al. (2012) and Iqbal et al. (2015), the excessive risk taking activities of
financial institutions are actually the result of good corporate governance practices. Based on the
value maximization principle, financial institutions have the tendency to maximize the
shareholders’ value, without properly measuring their risky behaviors. Many studies have
highlighted the lack of transparency and understandability in the activities of financial
institutions as the primary cause for the failure to detect such behaviors (Dhouibi et al. 2016;
Bushman, 2016; Mehran & Mollineaux, 2012; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Such features
diminished the function of market discipline in financial institutions. It is argued that market
discipline is essential for the proper functioning of the market system as a whole, particularly
among financial institutions, where it will enable external stakeholders to exert pressure when
management of financial institutions is acting against their interests (Mehran & Mollineaux,
2012). According to IASB (2013), this can be achieved through a common delivery system.
Blankerspoor et al., 2012 and Yoon et al., 2012 claim that XBRL has the potential to act as the
most suitable common delivery system. Many studies have found that XBRL adoption has
resulted in increased transparency of firms and improved quality of financial information through
increased flexibility and understandability. Hence, the tighter external control enabled by the
mandatory adoption of XBRL in 2009 is expected to reduce the excessive risk-taking behaviors
of the financial institutions, by acting as a complementary tool to resolve insufficiencies and
flaws of current corporate governance mechanisms. This will in turn reduce the overall systemic
risk of financial institutions listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). It is expected that
the XBRL adoption will result in the reduction of systemic risk for the financial institutions
listed in the NYSE.
H1: The mandatory adoption of XBRL will lower the systemic risk of financial institutions listed
in the NYSE, through improved corporate governance.
IV. Data and Research Methodology
The population for this research includes all financial institutions listed in NYSE, which totaled
up to 361 firms. The reason for particularly choosing NYSE is due to the fact that NYSE is the
largest stock exchange in the world in terms of its market capitalization. Many financial
institutions listed in NYSE are claimed to be the source of financial crisis, given their systemic
importance in the overall financial system. After having conducted the purposive sampling, the
list is narrowed into 45 firms. The data of these 45 firms will be of 4 years, two years pre (20072008) and post (2011-2012) XBRL adoption, with a total of 180 observations. The reason for
having chosen NYU Stern’s V-Lab as the source of data for systemic risk is based on the support
of wide literatures regarding the measure of systemic risk used. NYU Stern’s V-Lab uses SRisk
and MES which have been proposed by Acharya et al. (2012). Furthermore, NYU Stern’s V-Lab
specifically lists and ranks firms that contribute most towards the overall systemic risk. Thus, the
financial institutions chosen are compiled of those that have considerable impact towards the
systemic risk of the whole financial system. In regards to the research model, this study utilizes
the following research variables listed in the table below.
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Table 1
Research Variables
Classification
Dependent

Interaction

Variables
SRisk

Formulas
1

1

XBRLenv

Dummy Variable (0= pre adoption; 1= post adoption)

Corporate
Governance

Points rewarded for every attribute achieved based on
Governance Index by Brown & Caylor (2006)

XBRL

Gov

XBRLenv

Governance

log

Size

(LOGTA)

Capital Ratio
Control

Leverage
Return on Assets

Based on the above variables, the following model has been developed:

Where SRisk is defined as the amount of capital financial institution i needs at time t amidst
events of financial crisis and XBRL Gov is an interaction variable of XBRLenv and Corporate
Governance. The rest of the variables are defined in the above table.

V. Findings and Discussions
The research model is then run using the multiple linear regression analysis. The table below
is 68.4%. Thus, this
provides the summary of the results. As can be seen, the Adjusted
implies that the independent (XBRL×GOV) and control (Size, Capital Ratio, Leverage Ratio and
ROA) variables can explain the variances in SRisk by 68.4%. The other 31.6% of the variances
may be the result of other factors that are not included in the model such as regulations, deposit
insurance, loan growth and non-interest income (Iqbal et al. 2015; Weiß et al. 2014). Moreover,
the model has probability F-Statistics equal to 0.000. Hence, the model can be deemed
significant which implies that the model is accurate in testing the hypothesis. Again referring to
the table below, all control variables are deemed significant based on the t-test, where they have
p-values lower than 0.1. On the other hand, the interaction variable XBRL×GOV and
independent variable XBRLenv are highly insignificant, which can be seen from their p-values
of 0.515 and 0.468. Also, based on the VIF results, it can be concluded that the model is free
from multicollinearity problems.
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Table 2
Research Findings
Variables
Constant

-13756.848

XBRLenv

5518.700

Governance

-19109.812

XBRL×GOV

-7403.929

Size

6191.866

Capital Ratio
Leverage Ratio
ROA

t-stat
(p-value)

Coefficients

-1.877
(.062)*
0.728
(.468)
-2.311
(.022)*
-0.653
(.515)
7.793
(.000)*
-1.771
(.078)*
2.575
(.011)*

-12619.784
345.001

-2.647
(.009)*

-75296.605

Adjusted

68.4%

F-statistic

56.446

Prob (F-statistic)

(.000)

VIF
2
3
2
1

*Significant at α= 10%
SRisk = The amount of capital financial institution i needs at time t amidst events of financial crisis;
XBRLenv = a dummy variable where 0 represents company i operating prior mandatory XBRL
adoption and 1 represents company i operating post mandatory XBRL adoption; Governance = index
based on Gov-Score by Brown & Caylor, (2006); XBRL×GOV = an interaction variable between
XBRLenv and Governance; Size = the natural logarithm of the total assets of company i at time t;
Capital Ratio = the ratio of the amount of assets company i holds that are financed by equity at time t
(total equity divided by total assets); Leverage Ratio = the ratio of the amount of equity company i
holds that are financed by debt at time t (total liability divided by total equity); ROA = the performance
of company i at time t (net income divided by total assets).

As mentioned in section 2, it is expected that the systemic risk of financial institutions will be
lower post the adoption of XBRL, where it is believed that XBRL can improve corporate
governance which will in turn reduce systemic risk. Based on the regression results shown in the
above table, the relationship between SRisk and XBRL×GOV is in accordance to what has been
hypothesized. Nevertheless, by referring to the t test results for XBRL×GOV, it indicates that it
is not significant in explaining the variances of SRisk. Thus, it can be concluded that there is
insufficient evidence to reject null hypothesis, where corporate governance in the context of
XBRL do not significantly affect systemic risk of financial institutions listed in NYSE. Such
result may have been driven by the fact that the individual XBRLenv variable has no significant
relationship with SRisk. This signifies that the firms’ exposures towards systemic risk are
generally not affected by the implementation of XBRL. Based on the theories discussed in
section 2, it is expected that XBRL can reduce systemic risk by acting as the potential common
delivery system to strengthen corporate governance through the enhancement of market
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discipline. The insignificant regression results have further raised a question on how XBRL fails
to influence systemic risk. One of the most possible explanations has been outlined in the studies
of Angkinand et al. (2011), Kunt et al. (2008), Nier & Baumann (2006) and McCoy (2006).
According to Angkinand et al. (2011), debt holders of financial institutions lack the incentive to
perform monitoring functions in complement of regulations. They are reluctant to gather the
necessary information and act on it. Debt holders, which represent the largest portion of the
stakeholders of financial institutions (especially banks), have their stakes protected by deposit
insurance. The extrinsic and intrinsic deposit insurance provides the creditors with high financial
safety net. In particular, the intrinsic deposit insurance arises from experience, where previous
government bailouts of collapsed financial institutions serve as evidences that similar bailouts
will take place if the event is to occur in the future (Kunt et al. 2008). Meanwhile, the extrinsic
deposit insurance formally commits in advance on the return of partial or full amount of the
deposits of failed financial institutions. As a result, creditors believe that they are immune
towards the risk of potential loss in the case of default, which leads to the problem of moral
hazard. Moral hazard refers to the lack of incentives in safeguarding oneself against the risk of
possible losses, as one has been protected from the outcome of such risk. The problem of moral
hazard has caused the lack of motivation for stakeholders to act as external monitors. McCoy
(2006) even stated that insured depositors will not demand a risk premium or exert pressure
when banks are making unnecessary risky loans, as they expect government blanket guarantee
for their deposits in times of financial distresses. Such function is actually essential in
maintaining a strong market discipline. A strong market discipline arises when high quality of
information is available for stakeholders to assess the risk associated with the activities
undertaken by the firms. However, the problem of moral hazard clearly blunts the market
discipline of financial institutions. Hence, the increase in understandability and transparency of
information provided by XBRL to improve market discipline becomes abundant. As market
discipline is not affected by XBRL, the risk taking activities of financial institutions fail to be
mitigated. As a result, systemic risk of financial institutions is generally unaffected by the
presence of XBRL.
Additionally, the coefficient for XBRL×GOV (-7404) indicates a negative relationship
between the two variables. To provide further analysis over such relationship, it is important to
observe the effect of individual Governance variable towards SRisk. The Governance variable
alone has a significant negative impact towards SRisk. It indicates that a strong corporate
governance mechanism of financial institutions will in fact, be able to reduce systemic risk. This
finding is in contrast to what have been found by Iqbal et al. (2015). Iqbal et al. (2015) argued
that corporate governance mechanisms of financial institutions contain flaws and are still in need
of a tool to limit their risky behaviors. Such contrasting findings may be explained by the
difference in the time horizon of the sample taken. Iqbal et al. (2015) documented his finding
based on a sample within the years of 2005 and 2010, while this research has taken into account
the years of 2011 and 2012. Hence, this research provides an updated finding over the impact of
corporate governance towards systemic risk. Post crisis, many reforms have been made over the
regulations governing the activities of financial institutions. In particular, the 2010 Dodd Frank
Act and the Third Basel Accords have been implemented to provide tighter supervisions over
financial institutions in order to prevent the crisis from occurring again. Many regulations which
include updated capital adequacy requirements, stress testing and market liquidity risk have been
aimed to reduce financial institutions’ exposures towards systemic risk. Therefore, the
implementation of such regulations may have covered the flaws in the corporate governance of
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financial institutions which enabled them to effectively limit the risky behaviors of financial
institutions. The findings made by Iqbal et al. (2015) have not taken into account such reforms as
most of them came into effect only after 2010.
The regression results for all the control variables are as predicted. The coefficient sign
for each control variable is as expected and based on the t test, such results are deemed to be
significant. To begin with, the first control variable, Size has a coefficient of + 6192. The
positive sign indicates a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Such finding is
consistent with those of Iqbal et al. (2015) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) where larger financial
institutions are expected to contribute more towards the overall systemic risk. This is due to the
fact that that the growth in the size of financial institutions reflects the increase in opacity and
complexity of their activities, which makes it more difficult to detect their excessively risky
behaviors. Furthermore, large sized firms have many more stakeholders than smaller sized firms,
which as a result, increase the significance in their activities. The second control variable,
Capital Ratio has a regression result that is consistent with the findings of Iqbal et al. (2015) and
Brunnermeier et al. (2012). The coefficient of - 12620 indicates that it is negatively associated
with systemic risk. Financial institutions with higher capital ratio have high amount of capital
that can act as buffers during events of financial crisis. The retention of high capital ratio also
limits the firms’ ability to undergo excessive risk taking activities, which in turn reduces their
exposures towards systemic risk. The third control variable, Leverage Ratio has a positive
coefficient of + 345. This serves as evidence for the theory suggested in the study of Laeven
(2012). The study believes that Leverage Ratio must be directly associated with systemic risk.
Firms with high leverage ratios correspond with highly risky behaviors where it indicates that the
specific firms rely on high debt levels. As most of their capitals have been financed by debts,
these firms are believed to have high systemic risks as they are expected to experience high
default risks during financial turmoil. The fourth and last control variable, ROA is a measure for
firm performance. It has a coefficient of - 75297, which indicates that, the increase in the
performance of financial institutions result in the decrease in systemic risk. Such finding is
consistent with that of Iqbal et al. (2015) who found the same association between the two
variables.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendation
The role of financial institutions is very critical in the economy. However, the very nature of
their interconnectedness, complexity and opacity has rendered them to high degree of systemic
risks. The negative externalities of having exposed to such risks can be seen from the recent
2008 global financial crisis. Financial institutions prior crisis engaged in excessively risky
behaviors. Such behaviors amplified their exposures to systemic risk and in particular, were
undetected by their corporate governance mechanisms. Many studies have claimed the lack in
market discipline has caused the governance failure. A possible solution to solve such failure is
the implementation of a common delivery system which serves as a tool to improve market
discipline. This will strengthen the ability of corporate governance to detect the risky behaviors
of financial institutions, which eventually reduces their exposures towards systemic risk.
Existing literatures have documented that XBRL has the potential to serve as the common
delivery system as it can improve market discipline by enhancing information transparency and
understandability. When users of financial information are able to understand and receive good
quality of information in the form of XBRL instance document, they can exert pressures on
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financial institutions that are undergoing excessive risk taking activities. As a result, financial
institutions are forced to maintain high amount of capital and have limited ability to take on debt
which help reduces their exposures towards systemic risk. Nonetheless, there have been no
studies that have studied the impact of XBRL implementation specifically to the financial
industry and also its impact towards systemic risk. Therefore, this research aims to examine the
impact of XBRL implementation towards systemic risk in the context of NYSE listed financial
institutions. The impact of firm size, capital ratio, leverage ratio and performance on systemic
risk will also be studied.
This research is motivated by that of Iqbal et al. (2015) who found a somewhat
counterintuitive result in which corporate governance positively impact systemic risk based on
the value maximization principle. This research however, adds a new perspective in which the
corporate governance variable is interacted with XBRL. It is expected that XBRL serves as the
suitable tool to improve corporate governance which therefore, results in a negative association
with systemic risk, in contrast to that of Iqbal et al (2015). Nevertheless, this research found that
the impact of corporate governance towards systemic risk becomes insignificant when XBRL is
added. It shows that XBRL do not have any impact towards systemic risk. The reason for having
obtained such result may have been explained by existing studies of market discipline. The
effectiveness of market discipline in financial industry has been blunted by the existence of
moral hazard. The problem of moral hazard arises from explicit and implicit deposit insurance, in
which stakeholders (particularly creditors) become neglected towards the activities of financial
institutions. As a result, the ability of XBRL to improve quality of information available to the
stakeholders is generally ignored. Furthermore, the associations between the control variables
and systemic risk are all significant and as hypothesized. Size and leverage ratio positively
impact systemic risk while capital ratio and firm performance (ROA) have negative influence on
systemic risk.
In practice, this study is expected to have several implications. First, particularly for the
American government and standard setters, the finding suggests that XBRL failed to act as a tool
to limit the risky behaviors of financial institutions. Therefore, they cannot rely on the
implementation of XBRL to solve problems related to the excessive risk taking activities of
financial institutions. It has also been found that the size and leverage ratios of financial
institutions positively affect systemic risk. On the other hand, capital ratio and ROA (Return on
Assets) negatively impact systemic risk. Based on these findings, it can be implicated that
American standards setters and regulatory bodies must closely monitor poorly performing
financial institutions that are large in size, have low capital ratios and are highly leveraged.
Second, as this study can be considered as the first of its kind, it can serve as a starting point for
further research over the implementation of XBRL in the financial industry. It may attract
academicians and students, who are willing to further explore the possible benefits that XBRL
can provide. This may include its ability to reduce earnings management and detect off-balance
sheet transactions, etc. Moreover, through the findings of this study, it can be seen that XBRL
has failed to reduce systemic risk. Nonetheless, this research also found that stronger corporate
governance reduces financial institution’s exposure towards systemic risk. This finding is in
contrast to that of prior researches. Prior researches documented that corporate governance
mechanisms of financial institutions are still in need of a tool to reduce systemic risk. This has
been empirically proven by the fact that good corporate governances actually increased systemic
risk. Hence, the negative association between corporate governance and systemic risk found in
this research proves that corporate governance of financial institutions is no longer suffering
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from inefficiencies to limit risky behaviors. This amplifies the interest in recognizing the tool
that has actually caused such relationship. Through this study, it has been proven that XBRL
failed to act as the appropriate tool. Post crisis, many reforms have been made on the regulations
of financial institutions, such as the Dodd Frank Act and the Third Basel Accords. Therefore, it
will certainly be interesting to conduct a study regarding the effect of such reforms towards the
systemic risk and corporate governance of financial institutions.

References
Acharya, V.V. & Richardson, M. (2009). Causes of financial crisis. Critical Review: A Journal
of Politics and Society (195-210). DOI: 10.1080/08913810902952903
Acharya, V., Engle, R., & Richardson, M. (2012). Capital shortfall: A new approach to ranking
and regulating systemic risks. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings,
102(3), 59-64. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.3.59
Angkinand, A.P., Wihlborg, C. & Willett, T.D. (2011). Market discipline for financial
institutions and markets for information. Research Handbook on International Banking
and Governance, Forthcoming . Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886485
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1886485

Arnold, V., Bedard, J.C., Phillips, J.R., & Sutton, S.G. (2012). The impact of tagging qualitative
financial information on investor decision making: implications for XBRL. International
Journal of Accounting Information System, 13 (2-20). DOI: 10.1016/j.accinf.2011.12.002
Blankerspoor, E., Miller, B. P., & White, H. D. (2012). Initial evidence on the market impact of
the XBRL mandate. Review of Accounting Studies, 19 (1468-1503). Retrieved from
https://www.researchgate.net https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9273-4
Bullard, J., Neely, C.J. & Wheelock, D.C. (2009). Systemic risk and the financial crisis: A
Primer. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 91 (Part 1). Retrieved from
https://research.stlouisfed.org
Bushman, R.M. (2015). Transparency, accounting discretion and bank stability. Economic
Policy Review, Forthcoming. Retrieved from https://www.newyorkfed.org
Brown, L.D. & Caylor, M.L. (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, 25 (409–434). DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2006.05.005
Brunnermeier, M.K., Dong, G., Palia, D., 2012. Banks’ non-interest income and systemic risk.
Working Paper. Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu
Claessens, S. (2006). Corporate governance and development. Oxford University Press, 21 (91122). DOI:10.1093/wbro/lkj004
Dhouibi, R., Mabrouk, A., & Rouetbi, E. (2016). Bank transparency and risk taking: Evidence
from Tunisia. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 8 (5).
DOI:10.5539/ijef.v8n5p111
Diamond, D.W., & Verrecchia, R.E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital.
Journal of Finance, 46 (1325-1359). Retrieved from http://links.jstor.org
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x

Erkens, D.H., Hung, M. & Matos, P. (2012). Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial
crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide. Journal of Corporate Finance.
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005
IASB. (2013). A review of the conceptual framework for financial reporting. IASB Discussion
Paper. Retrieved from http://www.ifrs.org

35

AABFJ | Volume 11, no. 4, 2017

Ilias, A., Razak, M.Z.A., & Rahman, R.A. (2015). The expectation of perceived benefit of
extensible business reporting language (XBRL): A case in Malaysia. The Journal of
Developing Areas, 49 (263-271). DOI: 10.1353/jda.2015.0060
Iqbal, J., Strobl, S., & Vahamaa, S. (2015). Corporate governance and the systemic risk of
financial institutions. Journal of Economics and Business. DOI:
10.1016/j.jeconbus.2015.06.001
Jickling, M. & Murphy, E.V. (2010). Who regulates whom? An overview of U.S. financial
supervision. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.crs.gov
Kernan, K. (2008). XBRL around the world. Journal of Accountancy. Retrieved from
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com
Kunt, A.D., Kane, E. & Laeven, L. (2008). Deposit insurance design and implementation: Policy
lessons from research and practice. The MIT Press Cambridge. Retrieved from
https://mitpress.mit.edu
Laeven, L. (2012). Corporate governance: What’s special about banks? Keynote lecture at the
DNB-CGIC conference on corporate governance of financial institutions, Amsterdam,
November 2012. Retrieved from http://www.dnb.nl
Leuz, C. & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of information disclosure.
Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (91-124). Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
https://doi.org/10.2307/2672910

Levine, R.. (2004). The corporate governance of the banks: A concise discussion of concepts and
evidence. Working Paper, World Bank Policy Research. Retrieved from
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6521435.pdf
Levine, R. (2012). The governance of financial regulation: Reform lessons from the recent crisis.
International Review of Finance. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01133.x
Li, O.Z., Lin, Y., & Ni, C. (2012). Does XBRL adoption reduce the cost of equity capital?
Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =2131001
Liu, C., Luo, X., Sia, C. L., O’Farrell, G., & Teo, H. H. (2013). The impact of XBRL adoption in
PR China. Decision Support Systems, 59 (242-249). Retrieved from
www.elsevier.com/locate/dss https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2013.12.003
McCoy, P.A. (2007). The moral hazard implications of deposit insurance: Theory and evidence.
Seminar on current developments of monetary and financial law Washington, D.C.
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org
Mehran, H. & Mollineaux, L. (2012). Corporate governance of financial institutions. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 539. Retrieved from www.newyorkfed.org
Mehran, H., Morrison, A. & Shapiro, J. (2011). Corporate governance and banks: What have we
learned from the financial crisis? Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 502.
Retrieved from www.newyorkfed.org
Morgan, D.P. (2002). Rating banks: Risk and uncertainty in an opaque Industry. American
Economic Review, 92(4): 874–888. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net
https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280260344506

Nier, E.W. & Baumann, U. (2006). Market discipline, Disclosure and moral hazard in
banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation 15 (332-361). DOI:
10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001
Premuroso, R.F. & Bhattacharya, S. (2008). Do early and voluntary filers of financial
information in XBRL format signal superior corporate governance and operating
performance? International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 9 (1-20).
DOI:10.1016/j.accinf.2008.01.002
36

Suwardi &Tohang | An Analysis of XBRL Adoption Financial Institutions Listed in NYSE

Schnyder, G. (2012), Measuring corporate governance lessons from the bundled approach.
Journals of Accounting Research, 438. Retrieved from http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk
Weiß, N.F., Bostandzic, D., & Neumann, S. (2014). What factors drive systemic risk during
international financial crises? Journal of Banking & Finance, 41 (78–96). DOI:
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.001
Yahoo Finance: NYSE Quote. (2016). Retrieved from https://finance.yahoo.com/quote
Yoon, H., Zo, H., & Ciganek, A. P. (2010). Does XBRL adoption reduce information
asymmetry? Journal of Business Research, 64 (157-163).
DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.01.008

37

